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Corporations and the Public Purpose:  
Restoring the Balance 
Charlie Cray1 and Lee Drutman2 
In 2003, a new tobacco company called “Licensed to Kill, Inc.” was 
incorporated in Virginia.  The company’s purpose, as stated in its articles of 
incorporation, was “the manufacture and marketing of tobacco products in a 
way that each year kills over 400,000 Americans and 4.5 million other 
persons worldwide.”3 
Licensed to Kill was incorporated by anti-tobacco activists as a parody, 
but it proved an important point: virtually anybody can incorporate a 
business these days, even if the stated purpose of that business is to kill 
millions of people.  In a press release announcing the formation of the 
company, Licensed to Kill Director Gary Vastone publicly thanked the 
Virginia Corporation Commission for “granting us permission to exist.  If a 
person were to ask the state for authorization to go on a serial killing 
rampage, he would surely be locked up in a jail or a mental institution.  
Luckily, such moral standards do not apply to corporations.”4 
By granting Licensed to Kill a charter of incorporation, the state 
conferred a package of legal privileges on the company.  The corporation 
would be allowed to grow to unlimited size and scope, with an unlimited 
lifespan, and its shareholders would be entitled to limited legal liability.  In 
exchange, the state would receive virtually no benefit beyond a modest 
economic return.  All Licensed to Kill had to do was file some paperwork 
and pay a small fee of $130. 
Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds are giant tobacco companies with track 
records of selling deadly products to millions of consumers.5  They are large 
companies incorporated by state governments.6  Their parent companies, 
Altria and Reynolds American, are  incorporated in Virginia and North 
Carolina, respectively.7  These corporations continue to enjoy the privileges 
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granted by their corporate charters in the face of evidence that they have 
violated tobacco control laws around the world.8  Neither Virginia nor 
Delaware has ever proposed revoking the charters of these corporations, 
despite having the right and just cause to do so.9 
Dozens of corporations responsible for major social, ecological, and 
economic crimes continue to enjoy state-granted privileges, notwithstanding 
long criminal records.10  If they were ordinary persons, many of these 
corporations would probably be convicted and sentenced to long terms of 
imprisonment.  In some states, they might be executed.11  But corporations 
are not ordinary persons.  In fact, they are not persons at all. 
What is a corporation?  In essence, a corporation is one of many ways to 
organize business, money, and property.  It is a legal form, an abstraction 
that gives incorporators rights and privileges they would not normally 
enjoy.  The corporate form allows numerous investors to pool capital into 
one enterprise—the corporation—in exchange for ownership shares.  The 
owners set up a governance structure to do the business of the corporation, 
and if the company makes money, they share in the profits. 
There are millions of corporations of various kinds around the world.  
The corporation of principal concern in this article is the large, limited-
liability, publicly traded corporation because these corporations dominate 
our economy, politics, and culture.  The limited-liability corporation 
dominates our entire society. 
The ownership shares of limited-liability corporations are publicly traded 
on open markets such as the New York Stock Exchange.12  Their investors 
are responsible for debts and judgments against the corporation only up to 
the value of their initial investment (limited shareholder liability).  These 
companies also have privileges under state laws, such as permission to grow 
to unlimited size, to enjoy a perpetual life, and to own other companies.  
Nearly every Fortune 500 company13 is a large, limited-liability, publicly 
traded corporation.14  These corporations have virtually no inherent limits 
on behavior and present virtually no risk of liability for their investors. 
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Under the modern view of a corporation as merely a “nexus of contracts” 
between private individuals, the common illusion that corporations are 
primarily private entities with prerogatives beyond citizen control is now 
accepted as fact.15  However, there is nothing inherent to the corporate form 
that makes this inevitable.  Rather, its status as a private entity is the result 
of a long struggle in state and federal legislatures and courts.  The American 
business corporation evolved from a limited and tightly controlled franchise 
incorporated to complete public improvement projects such as constructing 
bridges, roads, and canals, and to provide certain services deemed essential 
to a fledgling economy, such as banking and insurance,16 to a sprawling, 
uncontrollable conglomerate over which the states relinquished their 
mechanisms of control. 
As a result, today we have a system in which large corporations are the 
dominant institutions in our society.  They maintain incredible power over 
our lives and can cause devastating social, ecological, and financial harms.  
And yet, despite their dominant position, they have very little accountability 
to the public.  As seen in the License to Kill example, today virtually no 
public benefits or obligations are bargained for in exchange for the 
advantages (e.g. limited liability) conferred through the corporate form, and 
the obstacles to doing so, built into the law and political culture, are 
significant.  The ability of the people to use public institutions, including 
governments, to control corporations is largely circumscribed.  The question 
becomes: how is it possible to restore public control over corporations? 
This article argues that understanding the fundamentally public nature of 
corporations is the key to restoring democratic control over them.  If we 
recognize that corporations are public institutions, created under a process 
in which ultimate authority is vested in the citizens, then it becomes clear 
that corporations do not intrinsically bear any rights or privileges except 
those that citizens choose to confer on them. 
In the first part of this article, we review some of the history of the 
American corporation by drawing upon key judicial decisions, legislative 
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history, and legal theory to trace how the corporation evolved from a public 
entity to a private entity over time.  We will see that the system of 
regulation that we currently use to control corporations emerged after the 
nineteenth century system of placing direct limits on corporations through 
their charters had disappeared. 
Next, we look at debates over the functions that specific corporations and 
industrial sectors are supposed to perform in society, and whether the 
broader public interest might be served in a different way.  Debates over the 
proper role of corporations have often centered around controversies over 
privatization, corporate abuse of publicly owned assets, and “corporate 
welfare.”17  We argue that an even broader debate over the nature and role 
of corporations in society is possible—even necessary. 
With this backdrop, we review a number of current industrial sectors and 
examine the evidence for treating some corporations as public institutions.  
In the absence of effective external regulation, it is worth resurrecting the 
notion that corporations must fulfill certain obligations as part of their 
“contract” with the society that grants them the privileges inherent in the 
corporate form (e.g. limited liability).  This is where our understanding of 
corporations as public institutions can begin to translate into broader policy.  
Federal chartering would be the most effective approach for industrial 
sectors such as defense-related corporations where there is a clear national 
interest at stake.  Other approaches, such as community-controlled 
corporations and non-corporate entities like community-based trusts may be 
appropriate vehicles for the delivery of essential services and protection of 
public assets.18 
It will only be possible to achieve such policies if the public is informed 
about past attempts to do so.  Only an engaged citizenry, motivated to 
reclaim its own authority to control corporations, can provide the kind of 
impetus that policymakers and even legal theorists need to challenge 
existing assumptions about  a corporation’s status under the law. 
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A HISTORY LESSON 
Although it is possible to trace the roots of the modern corporation back 
to Rome,19 a legal lineage that extends through medieval guilds and towns 
and churches and universities, most histories of the modern multinational 
corporation trace its origins to the big European trading companies.  These 
companies, such as the famous East India Company, were created by royal 
charter or by special act of Parliament in the  seventeenth century and were 
privileged to explore, colonize, and trade in lands beyond the sea.20 
The United States grew partly from the efforts of British colonial 
companies chartered to grab the riches of the new worlds opened up by 
Europe’s great explorers; both the East India Company and the Virginia 
Company were chartered by the crown for the purposes of exploring the 
New World and extracting its wealth and natural resources.21 The 
companies simultaneously dumped indentured servants and other unwanted 
people across the sea.22  These companies were different from modern 
corporations in that they were quasi-governmental institutions chartered to 
give members of the company exclusive trading privileges.  Members 
invested in “joint stock,” which at first represented only a subscription to a 
specific voyage, but later evolved into a system of ownership in the 
company for a period of time.  If the enterprise was a success, joint stock 
owners shared in the financial rewards in proportion to their investments.23 
Although the British charter companies anticipated the modern corporate 
structure, the simple structure of the early American economy meant that 
there was little demand for corporate charters for local enterprise until about 
1780.24  The giant trading companies of that day were chartered by the King 
and functioned as extensions of his power.  As a result, there was a general 
distrust of  big trading companies.25  The Boston Tea Party was the 
signature event in an economic rebellion against the East India Company’s 
attempt to monopolize American commodities markets.  The Boston 
merchants were rebelling against a British corporation and British crown 
whose interests were intertwined.26 
310 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
LINKING CORPORATE LAW WITH PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 After the Revolution, the Founding Fathers set upon the task of forming 
a new government. They were faced with the question of what role 
corporations should play in American society.27  But the memories of 
exploitation by the large British trading companies made many early 
American leaders wary of business forms that would confer special 
privileges.28  In his famous treatise, The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith, an 
economist and friend of some of America’s early leaders, was highly 
critical of corporations for this very reason.  
The pretense that corporations are necessary for the better 
government of the trade is without any foundation.  The real and 
effectual discipline which is exercised over a workman, is not that 
of his corporation, but that of his customers.  It is the fear of losing 
their employment which restrains his frauds and corrects his 
negligence.  An exclusive corporation necessarily weakens the 
force of his discipline.29   
Smith was opposed to corporations because he believed they interfered with 
the “invisible hand” of the free market: “It is to prevent this reduction of 
price, and consequently of wages and profit, by restraining that free 
competition that would most certainly occasion it, that all corporations, and 
the greater part of corporation laws, have been established.”30 
The National Trades Union also opposed incorporation, predicting that 
monopolies would ruin the individual enterprise and transform citizens into 
“mere hewers of wood and drawers of water to jobbers, banks and 
stockbrokers.”31  The resistance to corporations, therefore, was at the core 
of the struggle between the new monopolists and the artisan class over the 
meaning of “republicanism.” 
Despite these concerns, many community leaders recognized the 
corporation’s substantial potential for organizing civic and business affairs 
in the new post-war society.32  Meanwhile, the laws that encouraged the 
creation of local religious and secular education also helped to define the 
laws that encouraged the development of business corporations; in their 
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own ways, each of these types of organizations strongly contributed to the 
public welfare.33  In addition,  it was recognized that the new nation needed 
infrastructure projects like turnpikes and canals, as well as banks and 
insurance companies, to facilitate everyday commerce.  Through 
corporations, individuals were able to pool together the funds necessary to 
undertake projects and enterprises that presumably would benefit society as 
a whole yet were too massive and risky for individuals to undertake alone. 
Widespread public opposition to corporations led early legislatures to 
grant few charters, and usually only after much debate, but corporations did 
begin to proliferate by the end of the eighteenth century.  In contrast to the 
half-dozen American business charters granted in the entire colonial period, 
147 were issued in the United States between 1781 and 1795.34  These 
businesses were prohibited from taking any actions which the legislatures 
that incorporated them did not sanction in their charter.  When a corporation 
caused harm to public interests or went beyond its mandate, its charter 
could be revoked.35 
Much of what we attempt to accomplish today through regulation was 
accomplished in early America through the chartering process that defined a 
corporation’s purpose.  When a corporation violated its charter by operating 
ultra vires, or outside the powers bestowed upon it, the corporation could be 
dissolved by an act of the legislature that created it.36 
The struggle to control corporations through their charters continued for 
more than a century thereafter.37  Legislative debates over the creation of a 
corporation reflected an understanding of the public nature of corporations 
and established that the privileges bestowed by the people’s elected 
representatives would be granted only in exchange for a broader public 
benefit.38 
To keep corporations under control, legislatures placed limits on them 
through rules on capitalization, debt, land holdings, and profits.  Some 
states also limited corporate charters to a set number of years, forcing their 
review and renewal when the charter expired.  Unless a legislature renewed 
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a charter, the corporation was dissolved and its assets divided among 
shareholders.39  Legal rules limited the issuance of stock, clarified 
shareholder voting rules, and determined procedures for record keeping and 
disclosure of corporate information.40 
As additional mechanisms of control, specific rules written into corporate 
charters gave equal voting rights to large and small investors, outlawed 
interlocking directorates, and limited capitalization and debts.41  Under the 
ultra vires doctrine, corporations were prohibited from doing anything that 
was not specifically authorized in their charters.42  Companies were 
required to surrender their accounting books to the state legislature upon 
request.43 
In addition to protecting the public by limiting corporate power in their 
charters, states enacted laws to protect vulnerable constituents, to protect 
the public against various industry-specific abuses, and to impose personal 
liability up to par value of the stock for shareholders who acquired stock at 
a discount.44 
In 1800, the vast majority of the 334 corporations that existed in the 
United States were chartered to accomplish tasks that could rightly be 
considered the public’s business.  Sixty-five percent of these corporations 
were involved in building turnpikes, bridges, and canals.45  Another 20 
percent were involved in banking and insurance.46  Only eight corporations 
were involved in manufacturing.47  Henry Carter Adams described 
corporations as agencies of the state, saying: “They were created for the 
purpose of enabling the public to realize some social or national end 
without involving the necessity of direct government administration.  They 
were in reality arms of the state . . . .”48 
We should not become too nostalgic for these early days of American 
corporations.  Because legislatures controlled the granting of corporate 
charters, most of the charters went to politically well-connected and wealthy 
individuals who became richer and more influential though their 
corporations.49  Many of these early corporations received monopoly rights 
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as part of their charter and they pushed hard for other advantages that were 
not always in the public’s interest, testing the government’s control over 
corporate action.50 
Early government Attorney General Roger B. Taney observed: “It is a 
fixed principle of our political institutions to guard against the unnecessary 
accumulation of power over persons and property in any hands.  And no 
hands are less worthy to be trusted with it than those of a moneyed 
corporation.”51 
Although it has been suggested that the opposition to corporations during 
the early nineteenth century represents an agrarian failure to accept the 
efficiencies of the corporate form, small businesses and skilled artisans 
argued that corporations with their attendant privileges were too powerful.52 
The situation was complicated by proposals to open up the chartering 
process so that anyone could obtain a corporate charter, and thus to 
eliminate the air of political privilege surrounding the process of 
incorporation.  Andrew Jackson promoted this solution, and “sprinkled holy 
water on corporations, cleansing them of the legal status of monopoly and 
sending them forth as the benevolent agencies of free competition.”53  The 
hope was, in other words, to mitigate the problems created by the corporate 
form through further incorporation. 
The gradual shift from a system of corporate charters to the laws of 
general incorporation did not immediately prevent states from restricting the 
power of corporations in their charters.  That would not come until later, as 
corporations began to establish their independence in the courts and play 
states against each other in a charter-mongering process that loosened 
certain prohibitions and permitted the formation of giant corporate trusts at 
the end of the nineteenth century.54  The Jacksonian economic legislation 
eventually revealed a historical irony: it promoted the very ends it was 
intended to defeat.55 
In 1819, the Supreme Court struck a blow to state control over 
corporations by holding that New Hampshire’s attempt to turn Dartmouth 
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College, a private college chartered by the King of England in 1769, into a 
public institution was a constitutionally impermissible impairment of “the 
obligation of contracts.”56  This ruling was an instrumental shift in the 
relationship between corporations and the states that created them. 
“The [Dartmouth] . . . decision expanded the privileges of private 
property against the claims of the public interest, and it helped unleash 
capitalist enterprise in nineteenth century America,” intellectual historian 
Louis Menand suggests.57  It was a first step in defining the corporation as 
an entity beyond citizen control. 
In response, many states began to assert tighter public control by giving 
themselves constitutional powers to revoke or alter charters.58 
 
THE CORPORATE CHARTER RACE TO THE BOTTOM 
As the nineteenth century progressed, the economy changed.  
Agrarianism gave way to industrialization.  People left the countryside for 
the cities.  In an age of railroads and steel, of oil and manufacturing, 
corporations became powerful and, increasingly, national institutions.  And 
as corporate lawyers evaded existing limits on the size and scope of 
corporations by forming holding companies and trusts, state corporate law 
was about to hit a crisis point. 
Beginning in 1891, New Jersey enacted a series of laws that effectively 
relinquished its ability to regulate and control corporations through charters.  
First, New Jersey became the first state to allow corporations to buy and sell 
stock or property in other corporations and issue their own stock as 
payment, creating “holding companies” that were crucial to the functioning 
of trusts.59  Next, the state repealed its antitrust law in 1892.60  Lastly, in 
1896, the state enacted its General Revision Act, an embarrassingly 
permissive law that removed the fifty-year limit on corporate charters, 
allowed corporations to conduct business in any state or foreign country, 
and revised capitalization requirements to pave the way for massive 
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concentration.61  It also permitted companies to issue nonvoting stock, 
which enabled certain owners to raise capital while retaining control of a 
corporation with ease and permitted directors to amend bylaws without the 
consent of the shareholders.62 
As a result of the General Revision Act, a stampede of large companies 
reincorporated in New Jersey.  By 1900, 95 percent of the nation’s major 
corporations were chartered in New Jersey.63  New Jersey reaped the 
intended financial rewards from this sale of its own sovereignty.64  The cost 
to society, however, was dramatic.  Some companies that reincorporated in 
New Jersey did so to escape attempts by other states states at enforcing 
public accountability.  For instance, at the time of reincorporation in 1898, 
the Standard Oil Company of the famed oil baron, John D. Rockefeller, 
faced a contempt action in Ohio for refusing an Ohio Supreme Court order 
to dissolve the Standard Oil Trust, a network of companies under one board 
of directors that controlled 95 percent of all refined oil shipments by the 
1880’s.65  Without any means of enforcement, the Court’s finding that the 
trust was void as against public policy was rendered meaningless.66 
Because the vast majority of corporations flocked to incorporate in New 
Jersey, New Jersey’s law became the nation’s law, creating the legal 
opportunities for massive consolidation and combination into giant 
industrial trusts.  In less than a decade, the corporate law of one state would 
thoroughly transform the United States economy “from a reasonably 
competitive to an oligopolistic structure,” in which 328 consolidated 
corporations controlled roughly two-fifths of the country’s manufacturing 
capital by 1904.67  Between 1898 and 1902, a total of 2,653 large firms 
disappeared in a wave of merger mania.68 
Though other states initially expressed outrage at New Jersey’s changes, 
when they realized they could not force it to reverse the changes, many of 
them followed New Jersey’s example, removing almost all restrictions in 
corporate charters and doing away with the idea that corporations should be 
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held directly accountable to the public and should be reasonably constrained 
in their quest to pursue private profits.69 
When New Jersey finally attempted to revoke some of the privileges of 
its corporations in 1913 to stop the decline it had caused, it was already too 
late.  Many companies simply moved to Delaware, which in 1899 had 
adopted an even more permissive law than New Jersey—and offered even 
lower fees to incorporate.70  Delaware’s 1899 Act allowed incorporators to 
insert any provisions they wanted into the charter regulating the 
corporation, its directors, and its stockholders.71 
Today, more than 308,000 companies, including 296 (59.2 percent) of the 
Fortune 500 largest corporations in the United States, are incorporated in 
Delaware, which is widely acknowledged as having the most management-
friendly statutes of any state.72  Delaware law gives executives the most 
liberal control over the company.  As a result, the corporate law of 
Delaware has effectively become the national corporate law for the past one 
hundred years. 
THE RISE OF LIMITED LIABILITY 
Besides reducing their own ability to hold corporations directly 
accountable, states also fostered increased irresponsibility in the corporate 
form  through a widespread shift to limited liability for investors.  Limited 
liability meant that corporate investors were responsible for only their initial 
investment in the company.  If a company went into debt, investors might 
lose what they had invested, but the creditors or unpaid employees could 
not go after the investors’ personal assets. 
Limited liability corporations had been granted in Britain to investors in 
the East India Company and other business ventures, and was made 
universally available there in 1855.73  In the U.S., the acceptance of limited 
liability occurred only gradually over the course of the nineteenth century, 
through fits and starts, as it was often the source of raucous debate in state 
legislatures.74  Nevertheless, by the end of the century, as corporations 
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became larger and ownership grew increasingly diffuse, limited liability 
became a common feature, and became an embedded feature of the modern 
corporation as the system of general incorporation gradually replaced 
individual chartering.75 
Limited liability was justified as necessary to generate investment 
because it reduced risks.  However, it also encouraged corporate 
irresponsibility by removing owners from the consequences of their 
investments.  As legal scholar William W. Cook wrote in 1891, “[t]here is 
nothing in the corporate form itself to justify [the exaggerated application of 
limited liability].  This pernicious movement has decreased the personal 
responsibility on which the integrity of democratic institutions depends, and 
has introduced into both investments and social services a dangerous 
element of insecurity.”76 
Limited liability also contributed to the separation of ownership and 
control.77  By shifting risks from the corporation and its investors onto 
society as a whole, the law changed the nature of the corporation.  In short, 
these changes made the corporation much harder to control, less responsible 
by design, and hence, less responsive to the public. 
THE RISE OF CORPORATE RIGHTS 
In addition to limited liability and the shift in the incorporation process, 
another key development in the nineteenth century lent considerable power 
to the corporation’s claim as a private institution independent of public 
control.  Primarily as a result of judicial action, corporations increasingly 
acquired constitutional rights.78 
This process was connected to the emergence of theories of the 
corporation as a private entity.  That is, at the same time that the chartering 
process was replaced by general incorporation laws, the “concession” 
theory of corporations as artificial legal forms created by acts of the state 
was replaced by a theory of corporations as “natural entities” and “rights-
bearing entities” or “legal persons.”79 
318 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
LINKING CORPORATE LAW WITH PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Corporations were already recognized as possessing a personality 
separate from the individuals composing it by 1886 when the Supreme 
Court rendered its decision in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific 
Railroad.80  This case marked the first time the Supreme Court recognized 
corporate personhood as conferring constitutional rights.81 
In establishing the doctrine of “corporate personhood,” the Santa Clara 
court provided corporations with a potentially powerful new shield against 
public accountability.82  Boston University Professor of Sociology and 
Political Science Alan Wolfe suggests that “[i]f we believe that corporations 
are private agents, they are free to mind their own business outside the 
purview of the rest of society.”83  Moreover, private corporations are rights-
bearing creatures protected by the Constitution as individuals.  Most 
significantly, they enjoy the constitutional right to freedom of speech.  “If, 
on the other hand, corporations are understood as public actors, all these 
conclusions are reversed.  Corporations would have obligations not only to 
their shareholders, but also to others in the society as well . . . .”84 
TWENTIETH CENTURY ATTEMPTS AT CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 With the spread of general incorporation, and the conferral of 
constitutional rights on corporations, questions about how to maintain 
control over corporations began to shift away from the corporate chartering 
process, and instead toward government regulation and internal corporate 
governance.85  
Regulatory laws were not initially meek or modest, but corporations 
gradually took control of the federal regulatory agencies charged with 
enforcing those regulations—with predictable consequences.  Two 
corporate accountability experts dryly regarded this capture of the new and 
purportedly robust external regulation scheme as “[t]he ultimate commercial 
accomplishment.”86 
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Meanwhile, corporate law and theory began to center around debates 
over corporate “citizenship” and the public duties of corporate directors and 
officers.  This debate, which continues today, primarily centers around three 
main theories that have gained the most traction.  The first theory is the 
corporation as a separate entity.  Proponents argue that, as its own entity, 
the corporation has a duty to be a “good citizen” and to make decisions in 
the public interest, even above the objections of shareholders.87 
The second theory to gain traction is the idea that a corporation does the 
most public good by maximizing shareholder wealth.  This theory gained 
popularity because it allowed corporate lawyers to develop seemingly 
legitimate public policy around the idea that corporations owed no duty 
outside of its own shareholders.88 
The third theory is the “nexus of contracts” theory, in which the 
corporation was seen as a system of market-style bargains negotiated 
among various “stakeholders” who have different relationships to the 
corporation.  This theory, which became a dominant conception of the 
corporation in the second half of the twentieth century, diminished the 
public nature of the corporation and reduced the state to protecting and 
enforcing contracts made by private parties.89 
CHARTERING A NEW COURSE 
Today we have lost touch with the chartering process that creates 
corporations.  We must once again take the incorporation process seriously 
and recognize that incorporation is a privilege that the public offers to 
private investors, and the public ought to get something back in return.  This 
is the foundation upon which any serious attempt to establish legal control 
of corporations should be built.  Every corporation—whether it is Wal-
Mart, ExxonMobil, General Motors, or Halliburton90—exists because a 
state or federal government granted it a charter in exchange for a promise to 
obey the law. 
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Under the current paradigm of federal regulation, we rarely think about 
how we could place direct limits on corporations through their charters.  As 
the License to Kill example illustrates, incorporation today is a routine, 
bureaucratic process.  States ask little in return for giving incorporators 
legal privileges associated with the corporate form.  States can reassert 
control over corporations by creating real threats to revoke charters.  Every 
state has a statute that provides for the revocation of corporate charters.91  
This authority, exercised pursuant to a legal procedure known as quo 
warranto, remains woefully underused.92  Even corporations that engage in 
repeated criminal activities are rarely threatened with charter revocation.  
While all states retain the power to revoke, political pressure exerted by 
large corporations usually prohibits state legislatures and attorneys general 
from effecting corporate control through charter revocation.93 
In 1998, a group of thirty citizens’ organizations and individuals asked 
the state of California to exercise this authority.  With the help of Loyola 
Law School professor Robert Benson, the group filed a 127-page petition 
asking the California attorney general to revoke the charter of Union Oil 
Company of California (Unocal), based on its many environmental 
violations and its complicity in “unspeakable” human rights violations, such 
as its work with brutal governments in Afghanistan and Burma.94 
As the petition explained, courts have consistently held that certain acts 
of wrongdoing clearly warrant charter revocation.  Judges have upheld 
revocation as a remedy for “misuse” or “nonuse” of the corporate charter, 
“unlawful acts,” “fraud,” “willful abuse of chartered privileges,” 
“usurpation of powers,” “improper neglect of responsibility,” “excess of 
power,” “mistake in the exercise of an acknowledged power” and “failure to 
fulfill design and purpose.”95 
Corporations have been held dissolvable for failing to lay railroad tracks 
by a date promised, joining other companies to monopolize sugar, 
conducting fraudulent real estate practices, putting out false advertising, 
serving polluted water to customers, running baseball games on Sundays, 
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paying members of the President’s family excessive salaries, self-dealing, 
and for the apparent complicity of failing to remove the Corporate President 
after four convictions in one year for illegally selling alcohol.96 
California Attorney General Dan Lungren rejected the petition to revoke 
Unocal’s charter three days later in a three-sentence letter, declining to 
act.97  Professor Benson’s description of the event illustrates the absurdity 
of Lungren’s response: 
Lungren’s office went into a comical panic when it got wind of the 
petition.  His department called the California Highway Patrol the 
night before the coalition’s press conference at the state office 
building in Los Angeles and had the CHP warn the group not to 
appear because a permit was needed to have a press conference on 
state property.  Lungren’s spokeswoman told the press first that the 
attorney general had no authority to revoke corporate charters; 
then—oops!—reversed herself hours later and said the department 
would take several months to study it.  Three business days later, 
the refusal letter went out.98 
Though the petition failed, in 2003 the petition filers regrouped and 
worked to introduce a Corporate Three Strikes bill in the California State 
Senate.  As drafted, the bill would require the state attorney general to 
revoke the charter of any corporation that is convicted of three “major 
felonies,” defined as those that resulted in human death or incurred a fine of 
$1 million or more, within a ten-year period.99  Additionally, the attorney 
general would revoke the right to conduct business in the state from those 
corporate felons not subject to charter revocation by the California 
government.100  The law also would have required corporations to take out a 
full-page ad in the state’s leading newspapers to publicize their crimes.101 
Predictably, the bill met stiff resistance in committee, where it failed to 
get the support of two key Democrats.  The critics’ main concern was that a 
third-strike conviction would be disastrous for workers and shareholders.  
However, the bill contained a provision allowing the courts to appoint a 
receiver to take over and manage the affairs of the corporation “as justice 
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and equity require . . . and shall issue orders necessary to ensure that jobs 
and wages are not lost, to protect community interests and legitimate 
investor interests, and to maintain the entity’s obligations to protect the 
health, safety, and environment of workers and the public.”102 
Although the three strikes bill failed to pass, the proposal to use the same 
receivership process commonly applied to corrupt unions or bankrupt 
corporations is a potentially effective way to take into account any existing 
claims upon the corporation.  Receivership can also be leverage by which to 
require companies to restructure themselves and eradicate the source of 
lawbreaking behavior in order to be allowed to continue to conduct business 
in the future.  An example of how receivership might work in this capacity 
is the New York District bankruptcy court’s appointment of former 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) commissioner Richard 
Breeden as a corporate monitor in the case of WorldCom.103  Breeden’s 
report on WorldCom set out corporate governance changes with which the 
court required MCI (WorldCom’s successor) to comply in order to emerge 
from bankruptcy.  It established important precedents, including a cap on 
CEO pay.104  Although Breeden’s recommendations were relatively modest, 
a similar process could be used to force a corrupt business to restructure or 
make other internal reforms in order to make it more accountable to the 
public under a new charter. 
Numerous law enforcement officials have recognized revocation of a 
corporation’s charter as an appropriate sanction for corporate crime.  
Revocation of a charter is particularly useful when the criminal behavior 
cannot be isolated to a few individuals.  A 1979 Department of Justice 
(DOJ) report on corporate crime describes an approach similar to that used 
when organizations are placed into receivership: recidivist corporations 
with criminogenic cultures could be placed on a kind of probationary status 
under the direction of directiors appointed by a court (as was the case with 
Worldcom) or even a federal corporations commission.105  The DOJ report 
recommends that directors representing certain external, public interests be 
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empowered to recommend internal reforms, including invasive structural 
reforms targeted towards eliminating the source of repeat lawbreaking 
activities.106  The reforms chosen could include forbidding a corporation to 
engage in particular lines of business or commerce, or barring it from doing 
business in a geographical area or in a specific product line.107 
The recent wave of corporate scandals can be viewed as largely the result 
of an aggressive effort to deregulate certain industrial sectors—banking 
(repeal of the Glass-Stegall Act, which separated commercial and 
investment banking), telecommunications (Telecommunications Act of 
1996, loosening controls on media and spectrum technology corporations), 
and energy (the gradual gutting of the Public Utilities Holding Company 
Act by SEC exemptions provided to Enron and other companies, as well as 
proposals currently before Congress).108  All of these acts of deregulation 
allowed for the formation of corporate conglomerates with intrinsic 
conflicts of interest and anticompetitive structures.  In the absence of 
effective antitrust regulation,109 the use of structural reforms in corporate 
charters could be an effective means of restraining vertical integration and 
cross-industry ownership.110 
Although state attorneys general have shown little interest in using 
corporate charter revocation as a sanction on large corporations, they have 
occasionally revoked charters of small corporations.  The state of California 
alone, for example, revoked the charters of 58,000 smaller corporations in 
fiscal year 2001–2002 for failure to pay taxes or file proper statements.111 
More substantially, in 2001, the Texas secretary of state revoked the 
charter of Lionheart Newspapers Inc. (a publisher of more than seventy 
publications) for nonpayment of franchise taxes.112  And in 1998, New York 
Attorney General Dennis Vacco revoked the charters of two tobacco 
industry front groups incorporated as nonprofits: The Council for Tobacco 
Research and the Tobacco Institute Inc.113  Though the groups were 
officially incorporated “to provide truthful information about the effects of 
smoking on public health,” Vacco explained, “instead . . . these entities fed 
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the public a pack of lies in an underhanded effort to promote smoking to 
addict America’s kids.”114 
There is some evidence that law enforcement officials are becoming 
increasingly interested in using the charter revocation and re-chartering 
options to combat corporate crime.  When campaigning to replace Vacco in 
1998, future New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer declared that “[w]hen 
a corporation is convicted of repeated felonies that harm or endanger the 
lives of human beings or destroy our environment, the corporation should 
be put to death, its corporate existence ended, and its assets taken and sold 
at public auction.”115  Spitzer is well known for progressive views of 
corporate reform, and he is not alone.  Referring to the powerful coal 
industry’s abusive trucking practices, West Virginia Attorney General 
Darrell McGraw said, “If a corporation uses its corporate charter to commit 
an illegal act, then it’s our jurisdiction and our responsibility to do 
something about it.”116 
It has been suggested that the corporation’s status as a “person” under the 
law entitles it to certain constitutional protections against charter 
revocation.117  However, Professor Kent Greenfield has suggested that since 
their charters provide that corporations are incorporated only for “lawful” 
purposes, unlawful acts can be deemed ultra vires, or “beyond the power” 
of the corporation.118  In such instances,  corporations clearly violate the 
heart of the corporate contract and become subject to the enforcement 
powers of corporate law.119  While state officials in Delaware and elsewhere 
might choose not to enforce the ultra vires doctrine for political or other 
reasons, Greenfield suggests that shareholders could use it to enjoin the 
corporation’s continuing unlawful acts.120 
As Benson explains it, “[t]he people mistakenly assume that we have to 
try to control these giant corporate repeat offenders one toxic spill at a time, 
one layoff at a time, one human rights violation at a time.  But the law has 
always allowed the attorney general to go to court to simply dissolve a 
corporation for wrongdoing and sell its assets to others who will operate in 
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the public interest.”121  The failure of public officials to act accordingly 
suggests that the public service aspect of the corporate form has atrophied.  
However, it is still possible to reject the notion that the law gives 
corporations an intrinsic right to exist in perpetuity without regard to their 
behavior.  Instead, a sovereign people, acting through their elected 
government officials, create corporations and grant them privileges through 
their charters.  When corporations flout obligations to obey the law, and 
become a danger to society, the governments that create them have the 
right— and the means— to dismantle them. 
USING CHARTERS AS BLUEPRINTS FOR PUBLIC 
OBLIGATIONS 
 Another way to control corporations is by writing specific limits directly 
into the charters.  There is nothing prohibiting any state from placing limits 
on how big corporations can grow to be, how long they can exist, or what 
kind of liability investors should be exposed to.  There is nothing inherent 
in the corporation that requires it to enjoy the legal privileges it enjoys.  If a 
state wants to be serious about controlling corporations, it can change its 
incorporation laws to ensure that limits are placed on corporate size, scope, 
and behavior.  Moreover, once a corporation is bound by such rules, it is not 
free to break them.122 
Revising the use of charters in this manner would send a strong message 
that the state is serious about reasserting corporate obligations to serve 
public interests and to enable citizen control over corporations.  Of course, 
without other changes of law, the only practical result of corporate law 
reform might be to discourage any business from incorporating in the state.  
Corporations can incorporate in any state they like, and the rules of 
interstate commerce and their rights under the Constitution allow them to 
protect themselves from states’ attempts to limit their behavior when they 
are incorporated in another state.  If one state decided to enact restrictive 
corporate laws, most corporations would flee for friendlier legal grounds, 
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just as many corporations fled to New Jersey during the charter-mongering 
battles of the 1890s.123 
THE PROBLEM OF STATE-BASED CORPORATE LAW 
One of the oddities of our corporate law system is that although most of 
our large corporations conduct business on national and international levels, 
they continue to be chartered at the state level, and therefore state laws 
primarily supply the rules that control their existence and governance.  A 
state-based system of corporate law made sense two hundred years ago 
when state economies were much more distinct and corporations generally 
operated within a single state.  But today, when corporations operate 
anywhere in the world, such a chartering system seems woefully 
anachronistic. 
The consequence is that the state with laws most favorable to 
incorporators attracts the vast majority of incorporation activity.  As noted, 
that state is Delaware, home to 308,000 corporations, including almost 60 
percent of Fortune 500 companies, and recipient of $500 million a year in 
incorporation fees (roughly 25 percent of the state’s total revenues).124  The 
state with the second-highest number of Fortune 500 incorporations is New 
York, with just twenty-five incorporations.125  The result is that one state 
virtually sets the standards of corporate law for the entire country.  
Delaware, “a pygmy among the fifty states, prescribes, interprets, and 
indeed denigrates national corporation policy as an incentive to encourage 
incorporation within its borders, thereby increasing its revenue.”126 
Delaware offers the most pro-management statutes available, essentially 
allowing incorporators to do whatever they would like as long as it is not 
otherwise illegal. 
This situation presents a troubling obstacle to holding corporations 
democratically accountable through corporate law.  If tiny Delaware 
(population: 820,000) effectively sets the corporate law for the entire 
nation, and in some cases, the world, more than 99 percent of Americans 
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have essentially been cut out of deciding how corporations should be 
governed.127  Law professor Daniel J. H. Greenwood has concluded: 
“Citizens, acting through the political process as presently constituted, have 
effectively no say in constituting corporate law.  The law, and the 
corporations formed under it, are rather products of a market that, by 
historical accident, has freed itself from political control.”128 
 Under the Delaware system, corporate managers are entrusted with 
stewardship of enormous concentrations of wealth and power—in many 
instances both larger and more important in our daily lives than most 
governmental units—with little supervision or answerability to the political 
process.  These autonomous power concentrations, in turn, are granted the 
strikingly unusual right to choose the law that governs them, thus 
guaranteeing that corporate law will continue to respect their independence 
from the will of the people.  In short, we have created institutions of major 
importance and power and then set them on their way to do good or ill with 
little control or influence by the citizens whom, ultimately, they should 
serve.129 
Corporations are subject to the environmental, labor, securities, and other 
laws of each state in which they operate.130  Why should corporate 
governance laws be any different? If state legislatures want to make sure 
that employees or shareholders of corporations that operate primarily within 
their state enjoy more rights than Delaware corporate law grants them, why 
should they be prohibited from doing so? There is simply no good reason.  
Yet Delaware effectively sets the corporate law of the nation and creates a 
troubling obstacle for the ability of states to regulate and control 
corporations that operate within their borders. 
One way to deal with this problem would be for a state (say, for example, 
New York) to challenge the ability of Delaware to set corporate governance 
rules for corporations that operate primarily in New York.  Professor Kent 
Greenfield suggests that Delaware’s dominance is illegitimate “because its 
ability to define the rules of corporate governance depends on the so-called 
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‘internal affairs’ doctrine, which provides that the rules governing the 
internal affairs of corporations (that is, the rules of corporate governance) 
originate from the state in which the corporation is chartered.”131  
According to Greenwood, the internal affairs doctrine was not originally 
established under constitutional or statutory provisions of law, but only 
under judicial tradition, though some statutes now embody the principle.132 
In fact, during the 1980s and early 1990s—a period of big mergers and 
acquisitions and plant closures—some states moved to change their 
corporate laws to require the courts to reflect the interests of employees and 
other stakeholders.133  As a result, in over half of the states directors are 
now permitted to take stakeholder interest into account.134  Connecticut, for 
example, requires boards to consider the interests of corporate stakeholders 
when making major decisions.135  Meanwhile, a recent proposal has also 
been made to further expand the duties of corporate directors to account for 
the interests of communities, the environment, and other stakeholders.136 
Greenfield argues that the state that has the greatest interest in regulating 
the internal affairs of a corporation should determine the rules of corporate 
governance.137  In practice, this means states would impose their own 
corporate governance laws on corporations whose business is primarily 
carried on within that state, regardless of where the corporation is 
incorporated.  When these laws come in conflict with Delaware law (as they 
inevitably would), it would ultimately be up to a judge.  By relaxing 
constraints on the internal affairs doctrine, corporate law would become 
more democratic.138 
IS IT TIME TO REVIVE THE FEDERAL CHARTERING 
OPTION? 
Another way to solve the problem of conflicts in state corporate law 
would be to establish a system of federal chartering for businesses that 
operate in multiple states.  Instead of a competition among states to enact 
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the most pro-corporate laws, a federal chartering system could require a 
consistent set of rules about internal corporate governance. 
The push for a federal chartering system is not a new idea, despite how 
little traction it has gained thus far among corporate-controlled political 
debates.  Proposals for federal corporate charter laws were included in the 
1904 Democratic Platform, the 1908 Republican Platform, and the 1912 
Democratic Platform.139  Between 1915 and 1932, at least eight bills related 
to federal chartering were introduced in Congress.140  In the 1930s, populist 
Senator Joseph O’Mahoney of Wyoming promoted the idea of “National 
Charters for National Business.”141  In his statement to the Temporary  
National Economic Committee (TNEC) at its closing session on March 11, 
1941, O’Mahoney suggested that to ensure business responsibility it is 
necessary to have “a national charter system for all national 
corporations.”142 
O’Mahoney’s proposal would have required corporations with assets in 
excess of $100,000 to obtain a federal license to engage in interstate 
business, forbade stock ownership by one corporation in another and the 
diversification of a corporation’s business beyond the provisions of its 
charter.143  O’Mahoney threatened corporations that violated child labor and 
collective bargaining laws with the loss of their license to do interstate 
business.144  His effort to control corporate power through federal chartering 
was derailed by the gathering storm surrounding World War II, and the 
TNEC that O’Mahoney convened to ask tough questions about corporate 
excesses was largely forgotten.145 
In 1976 the idea of federal chartering was again revived by Ralph Nader, 
Mark Green, and Joel Seligman in Taming the Giant Corporation.146  They 
proposed a federal law requiring national businesses with more than $250 
million in annual sales or more than 10,000 employees to obtain a federal 
charter.147  These charters would include requirements for full-time outside 
directors, disclosures about workplace conditions, prohibitions against 
monopoly concentration, and disclosure of lobbying activities and tax 
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returns—all provisions designed to protect shareholders, employees, 
consumers, taxpayers, and communities.148 
“The problem is ultimately one of power,” they wrote.  They posed this 
question: How do we limit unaccountable power and ensure that corporate 
executives who hold managerial power are the best possible managers?149  
They proposed a system of federal chartering that requires corporations to 
pay attention to a broad range of public concerns beyond profits.150 
There are a handful of federally chartered companies today.  Amtrak is 
federally chartered, as are mortgage lenders Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae.151  Both of these lenders were created to operate in the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development for the public purpose of increasing 
homeownership.152  Fannie Mae’s amended charter directs it towards 
purposes that would not normally be served by for-profit corporations.  It 
provides assistance to secondary markets for residential mortgages, 
including activities related to mortgages on housing for low- and moderate-
income families.153  Fannie Mae also provides home loans, including loans 
for energy conservation and solar power systems, and collects data to 
monitor discriminatory practices in the home mortgage industry.154 
EVALUATING THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OPTION 
As a policy matter, it makes sense to consider once again the federal 
chartering process as a mechanism for containing corporate power and 
effectuating important national corporate reform policies.  A state-based 
system of corporate law presents formidable obstacles to national reform.  It 
makes the use of the chartering process to increase accountability in 
corporations difficult unless all fifty states were to adopt the same reform 
simultaneously.  Moreover, federal chartering is a useful mechanism for 
effecting public health and other kinds of policies where specific industries 
wield considerable influence. 
Consider Big Tobacco, for example.  Towards the end of his memoir, A 
Question of Intent, David Kessler, the head of the Food and Drug 
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Administration from 1990 to 1997, concludes that regulating the tobacco 
industry in the traditional sense would not adequately achieve national 
public health objectives: 
My understanding of the industry’s power finally forced me to see 
that, in the long term, the solution to the smoking problem rests 
with the bottom line, prohibiting the tobacco companies from 
continuing to profit from the sale of a deadly, addictive drug.  
These profits are inevitably used to promote that same addictive 
product and to generate more sales.  If public health is to be the 
centerpiece of tobacco control—if our goal is to halt this manmade 
epidemic—the tobacco industry, as currently configured, needs to 
be dismantled . . . .  [T]he industry cannot be left to peacefully reap 
billions of dollars in profits . . . .155 
After attempting to regulate the tobacco industry for seven years, Kessler 
concluded it was necessary to dismantle the industry in order to deal with 
the public health menace it had created.156  He proposed forcing tobacco 
companies to be spun off from their corporate parents, and called for 
Congress to “charter a tightly regulated corporation, one from which no one 
profits, to take over manufacturing and sales.”157 
Kessler’s solution to the tobacco problem resonates with the argument we 
make about federal corporate chartering.  The public needs to exercise 
control over corporations its laws have created.  Corporations that 
consistently harm the public should not have government charters that allow 
them to continue to conduct business.  Kessler’s ideas would help rein in 
corporations that directly threaten our collective well-being.  Tobacco has 
been recognized as a public health threat for some time.  The Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention estimates that in addition to 440,000 
premature deaths, smoking costs the nation $167 billion a year in health 
care costs and lost productivity—well over seven dollars for each pack of 
cigarettes purchased by consumers.158 
Although Kessler’s tobacco proposal is unlikely to be introduced in 
Congress anytime soon,159 it reminds us that that our ability to control 
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corporations comes from a powerful starting point: We create corporations 
and endow them with rights and privileges for one ultimate purpose—to 
serve the public good.  Upon this basic framework, much follows. 
Kessler’s proposal to federalize and re-charter the tobacco industry stems 
from the need for a strong national health policy with explicit consequences 
for industrial practices.  A similar approach could be used to control other 
dangerous technologies.  The chlorine industry, for example, is at the center 
of the spread of certain persistent toxic pollutants (e.g., dioxin, PCBs, 
pesticides, ozone-depleting chemicals, etc.) recognized to cause a wide 
range of serious human health and environmental effects.160  Various 
organizations including the American Public Health Association,161 the 
U.S./Canadian International Joint Commission on the Great Lakes,162 and 
environmental groups, have called for a planned phaseout of the industrial 
production and use of chlorine-based chemicals—a class that includes 
11,000 individual chemicals.163 
In 1994, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed to study 
the viability of a national strategy to “prohibit, substitute, or reduce” the use 
of chlorine in four key industrial sectors (PVC, solvents, pulp bleaching, 
and water treatment), but a powerful response from the Chlorine Chemistry 
Council defeated the EPA’s proposal.164  Additional calls for the 
elimination of chlorine-based chemicals were made in the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,165 which has targeted a 
“blackout” list of global pollutants of highest concern.166 
A national public health strategy to phase out chlorine in order to protect 
human health, the environment, and national security167 could be achieved 
by a strategy similar to Kessler’s proposal for controlling Big Tobacco.  
Under such a policy, corporations that produce and use chlorine would be 
required to phase it out or separately re-charter their chlorine-based 
production activities as part of a planned phaseout, providing a transition 
that takes into account the interests of communities and workers.168 
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In order to illustrate how federal chartering could provide greater public 
control over corporations, this article will examine four “private” industries 
that have tremendous influence on public policies important to the broader 
society.  First, we will look at the nation’s defense and security contracting 
firms and the question of national security.  Second, we will examine the 
accounting industry and its failure to adequately meet the needs of the 
investing public.  Third, we will discuss broadcast media and its substantial 
effect on community affairs.  Finally, we will move beyond the federal 
chartering model to examine certain essential services where local control is 
a more suitable mode of public regulation. 
FEDERAL CHARTERING AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
 It is hard to imagine an industrial sector better suited for federal 
chartering than the nation’s defense and security contracting firms.  The 
existence of these firms is predicated upon federal policy goals with the 
largest receiving major income streams through federal contracts.  For 
example, Lockheed Martin, the Pentagon’s number one primary contractor, 
received $21.9 billion in 2003 from the Pentagon out of its total sales of $32 
billion.169  Yet, even national defense corporations are chartered under state 
law and they enjoy the same weaknesses of state control that benefit other 
private corporations. 
As private firms, the defense contractors are able to engage in lobbying, 
make campaign contributions to key members of Congress, and engage in 
other forms of influence-peddling in order to influence defense policy 
planning and weapons systems expenditures.  Examples of private 
contractors defining the government’s defense policy are rampant and 
systemic.  In the recent case of Halliburton in Iraq, for example, Bunnatine 
Greenhouse, the senior contracting specialist with the Army Corps of 
Engineers blew the whistle on Halliburton’s involvement in the contracting 
process.170 “I can unequivocally state that the abuse related to contracts 
awarded to KBR represents the most blatant and improper contract abuse I 
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have witnessed during the [twenty year] course of my professional career 
[in government contracting],” said Greenhouse.171 
The problem extends far beyond Halliburton.  The growth of private 
military firms and corporate intelligence contractors in the past decade has 
created additional profitmaking pressures on national security policymaking 
processes.172  Interlocking relationships exist between the largest defense 
contractors and the Pentagon—including corporate representation on key 
defense planning boards, and the regular passage of Pentagon and industry 
personnel through the proverbial “revolving door”—i.e., to the private 
sector companies that they formerly oversaw.173  The result is a steady 
stream of abusive contracting practices and a potentially dangerous 
distortion of American national security objectives.  As a New York Times 
reporter describes the situation, “Lockheed has become more than just the 
biggest corporate cog in what Dwight D. Eisenhower called the military-
industrial complex.  It is increasingly putting its stamp on the nation’s 
military policies, too.”174 
Another result of defense contractors’ influence over Congress and 
defense policy boards is a long-term commitment to the development of 
high-tech weapons systems that only specific contractors are able to 
produce.175  These weapons systems arguably have little to do with 
preventing acts of terrorism—one of the nation’s current greatest security 
concerns. 
Two decades after President Eisenhower alerted the nation to the perils of 
maintaining a permanent “military-industrial complex,”176 John Kenneth 
Galbraith suggested that it was time to recognize that big defense 
companies like General Dynamics and Lockheed, which do all but a 
fraction of their business with the government, are really public firms and 
should be nationalized.177  “By no known definition of private enterprise 
can these specialized firms or subsidiaries be classified as private 
corporations,” Galbraith wrote.178  He noted that much of the fixed capital 
of these firms is owned by the government and that as a highly-concentrated 
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industry, the defense firms were effectively protected from competition.179  
In 1968, 10 percent of defense contracts were subject to competitive 
bidding and 60 percent went by negotiations to contractors which were the 
only source of supply.180  There was no market between the firm and the 
government.  Instead, members of two public bureaucracies worked out 
agreements for supplying weapons and other war technologies.181 
“The process of converting the defense firms from de facto to de jure 
public enterprises would not be especially complicated,” Galbraith 
suggested, outlining a transition plan for doing so: If a company or 
subsidiary exceeded a certain size and degree of specialization in the 
weapons business, its common stock would be valued at market rates well 
antedating the takeover, and the stock and the debt would be assumed by 
the Treasury in exchange for Government bonds.  Stockholders would thus 
be protected from any loss resulting from the conversion of these firms. 182  
Galbraith proposed that the new nonprofit companies directors would 
could be designated by the Government.183 
The greatest enthusiasm for Galbraith’s proposal came from individuals 
associated with these defense firms who had witnessed fantastic waste and 
misuse of the nation’s resources.  Many liberal members of Congress, who 
received campaign contributions from the defense sector, opposed the 
idea.184 
Converting the companies to publicly-controlled, nonprofit status would 
introduce a key change: it would reduce the entities’ impetus for aggressive 
lobbying and campaign contributions.  Chartering the defense contractors at 
the federal level would in effect allow Congress to ban such activities 
outright, thereby controlling an industry that is now a driving force rather 
than a servant of foreign policy objectives.  As public firms, they would 
certainly continue to participate in the policy fora designed to determine the 
nation’s national security and defense technology needs, but the profit-
driven impetus to control the process in order to best serve corporate 
shareholders would be eliminated.  Thus, by turning defense and security 
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firms into full public corporations, we would replace the criteria by which 
their performance is judged from quarterly earnings targets to criteria that is 
more consistent with the national interest. 
ACCOUNTING IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The accounting industry185 is another industry whose failure to 
adequately serve the public interest remains a significant problem.  It, too, 
creates an opportunity to introduce national policies that would place in the 
public domain a function crucial to sustaining investor confidence in public 
securities markets. 
Accounting firms played an important role in Enron’s collapse into 
bankruptcy and other recent financial accounting scandals by authorizing 
financial reports that involved major forms of deception.186  The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 provides for strong penalties for financial fraud,187 and 
eliminates certain conflicts of interest created by the consulting work that 
accounting firms conducted for their audit clients.  But the act exempted tax 
and other forms of consulting that continue to constitute a major part of the 
accounting industry’s business.188 “Tax work requires you to be an advocate 
for the client,” a critic of the loophole recently pointed out to the Financial 
Times. “That is not compatible with audit work.”189  In addition, tax 
consulting companies continue to engage in outside business dealings with 
their directors and have high-ranking executives who formerly worked for 
the accounting firm, which can compromise the objectivity of the 
auditors.190 
Columbia University Law School Professor John Coffee suggests that 
auditors serve a necessary function as “gatekeepers” for corporations whose 
assertions about their own financial health are inherently suspect.191  As 
independent watchdogs, auditors scrutinize corporate financial statements 
and certify their accuracy.  Yet the accounting firms create conflicts of 
interest that undermine their objectivity and prudence by accepting millions 
of dollars worth of consulting contracts with the same clients to develop and 
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implement the very procedures that they are later required to audit.  Given 
the financial rewards for complacency built into the system, it is difficult to 
imagine how public confidence can be restored unless auditing functions 
are established in a completely independent body accountable to the public. 
The Supreme Court reversed a lower court’s conviction of Arthur 
Andersen for its role in the Enron scandal, one of many accounting scandals 
that ultimately led to its demise.192  However, the firm was a recidivistic 
offender that suffered significant damage to its reputation for its role in 
other accounting scandals, including Waste Management193 and Sunbeam194 
before Enron, and MCI/WorldCom,195 Global Crossing,196 and Qwest,197 
afterwards.198 
Andersen is not alone in its failure to provide an objective check on 
corporate financial reporting.  All of the Big Four accounting firms199 have 
been implicated in massive audit failures that cost investors billions of 
dollars.  The global Big Four accounting firm Deloitte & Touche, for 
example, faces $10 billion in shareholder claims for its role in Parmalat, the 
“Enron of Europe.”200  The firm also paid $50 million to settle Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) civil charges that it failed to prevent 
massive fraud at Adelphia.201 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), another Big Four accounting firm, paid 
$48 million in 2005 to end litigation related to Safety-Kleen, a payout 
consistent with previous class-action settlements for its role in Raytheon 
($50 million) and U-Haul International’s parent company Amerco Inc. ($50 
million).202 
Ernst & Young, a third Big Four firm, has also had major problems that 
threaten its existence, including a $4.7 billion negligence claim by UK-
based Equitable Life.203  In April 2004, the SEC barred the firm from taking 
on new clients for six months and ordered it to take on an outside monitor to 
overhaul its independence policies, described by the SEC as a “sham.”204 
The SEC administrative law judge found the firm’s “day-to-day operations 
were profit-driven and ignored considerations of auditor independence” by 
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jointly marketing consulting and tax services with an audit client, 
PeopleSoft Inc.205 
KPMG, the last of the Big Four accounting firms, faces lawsuits for its 
auditing role at Fannie Mae (widespread accounting manipulations forced 
Fannie Mae to restate an estimated $9 billion in earning in 2005),206 Xerox 
(KPMG paid $22.5 million to settle charges brought by the SEC, the largest 
regulatory penalty paid by an auditor in history),207 and Gemstar-TV Guide 
International, Inc. (it agreed to pay $10 million to Gemstar shareholders).208  
KPMG admitted to criminal wrongdoing and agreed to pay $456 million in 
fines, restitution and penalties as part of an agreement with the Justice 
Department to defer prosecution of the firm in association with the 
marketing of problematic tax shelters that cost the IRS $2.5 billion in 
evaded taxes.209  KPMG had “firm-wide numerical goals for new tax idea 
submissions” and pressured KPMG tax professionals to meet this goal, 
according to one report.210 
Regulators feel constrained to sanction the Big Four when it comes to 
new evidence of unprofessional behavior.  After Andersen, no one wants to 
be blamed for causing another firm to collapse.  Yet major accounting 
scandals are a virtual certainty.  The FBI predicts that “major white collar 
crime will impact the U.S. economy over the next five years.”211  The 
Bureau is currently investigating over 189 major corporate frauds, eighteen 
of which involve losses exceeding $1 billion.212 
The concentration of the accounting industry has raised concerns that the 
collapse of another “Big Four” firm could cause “paralysis in financial 
markets.”213  The Big Four audit 97 percent of all public companies in 
America with sales over $250 million.214  Few industry observers believe 
that any of the next-largest firms could handle the kind of giant, multi-
national accounts that the global accounting firms are equipped to 
service.215 Moreover, in the event that only three big accounting firms 
remained, it would be difficult for the client companies to juggle the 
relationships necessary to comply with conflict of interest rules. 
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It is not clear that the collapse of another big accounting firm can be 
prevented given the emasculation of corporate crime enforcement and tort 
reforms that extend beyond the already problematic ones passed in the 
1990s.216  As it is, the Big Four accounting firms face an estimated $50 
billion in outstanding claims, and have huge problems getting insurance, 
particularly against unpredictable “catastrophic” risk.217  In 2005, the 
industry implicitly acknowledged its perilous position when it signaled its 
intent to introduce a legislative limit on auditors’ liability.218  The firms’ 
precarious position and continuing conflicts of interest provide a significant 
basis for federalizing the auditing function. 
Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) proposed this kind of approach to 
financial auditing problems in early 2002, before Andersen collapsed and 
Sarbanes-Oxley was completed.  Kucinich’s bill would have created a 
Federal Bureau of Audits responsible for auditing all publicly traded 
corporations.219  “Americans rely on the FBI to protect them from criminals 
and terrorists, the FBA (Federal Bureau of Audits) [would] protect 
American stockholders from the silent crimes committed by corporate 
criminals,” Kucinich suggested.  “The Enron scandal suggests we need cops 
who carry calculators instead of firearms!”220 
Given the precarious state of the accounting industry, a conservative case 
can be made that placing the auditing process under federal control is 
necessary to preserve the country’s free-market system.  We must recognize 
that accounting fraud has calamitous consequences for the firms involved, 
for millions of people who depend on the performance of the market for 
their retirement security, and for the broader economy.  In this respect, 
confidence in corporate financial reporting is a question of national 
economic security. 
THE NEWS MEDIA DEBATE 
Another sector of the U.S. economy that falls largely within the public 
domain, but is dominated by the investor-driven interests of corporate 
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conglomerates, is the broadcast news media.  Broadcast corporations pay 
nothing for using the public’s airwaves, the most valuable resource of the 
information economy, with an estimated commercial value of over $750 
billion.221  The United States Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting v. 
FCC concluded that broadcasters who receive licenses to operate on the 
public airwaves free of charge must serve the public interest.222  Given a 
license to operate, they are granted the privilege of using scarce community 
broadcast frequencies, and are therefore “obligated to give suitable time and 
attention to matters of great public concern.”223 
Under current FCC standards, corporate broadcasters are required to meet 
minimal requirements as a condition of their local station licenses, but the 
requirements are not very significant.  These requirements include 
preparation of public reports on children’s programming and an assessment 
of how they are serving their listening communities,224 providing 
“reasonable access” to legally qualified political candidates as defined by 
FCC rules and regulations,225 and providing closed-caption television 
programming.226  In reality, most broadcasters air their scant community 
messages in the “wee hours of the night,” when audiences are at their 
lowest and it is impossible to sell commercial advertising.227  A 2003 survey 
of local TV stations in six different markets determined that only 0.5 
percent of programming covered local public affairs, despite the potential 
value of “localism” in serving the public interest.228 
In large part as a result of FCC policies to loosen ownership caps, the 
ownership of broadcast media across the nation has been concentrated into 
only a handful of huge media conglomerates such as Viacom, Time Warner, 
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, General Electric, and Disney.229  
These corporations have an enormous impact on the information an average 
American receives.  A similar concentration of ownership has occurred in 
radio.  As a result of loosened ownership rules, Texas-based Clear Channel 
has rapidly acquired over 1,200 U.S. stations in a few years and begun to 
broadcast homogenized programming in cities and towns across the 
Corporations and the Public Purpose  341 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 1 • 2005 
country.230  Media analysts link this concentrated corporate ownership of 
the media to a decline in the dissemination of independent, community-
based political perspectives, with significant adverse consequences for 
democratic discourse and community well-being.231  In Minot, North 
Dakota, for example, where six radio stations are owned by Clear Channel, 
it took over an hour for the police to disseminate emergency information 
about a lethal spill of toxic chemicals because the local stations were 
broadcasting content that originated 1,600 miles away.232 
Across the political spectrum, and even within the broadcast industry, 
critics blame media corporations for effectively preventing diverse access to 
the airwaves and thus lowering news reporting standards.  CNN founder 
Ted Turner argued that had he started his career in broadcast ownership in 
2003, when the FCC proposed to further loosen media ownership rules, he 
would not have been able to launch CNN.233  Turner stated, “[l]arge media 
companies are far more profit-focused and risk-averse.  They sometimes 
confuse short-term profits and long-term value.  They kill local 
programming because it’s expensive, and they push national programming 
because it’s cheap—even if it runs counter to local interests and community 
values.”234 
A growing media reform movement has developed a number of strategies 
to reclaim the public’s airwaves, protect public broadcasting and hold news 
corporations accountable to their public interest obligations.  These 
strategies include local challenges to broadcast license renewals, demands 
for limits on commercial advertising, and establishment of free municipally 
controlled wireless communication networks.235  These efforts seem to be 
supported by the language of the U.S. Supreme Court.  “It is the purpose of 
the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in 
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance 
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a 
private licensee.”236  Even within the FCC, some commissioners support 
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broader license renewal obligations that force radio stations to take their 
public interest obligations more seriously or lose their licenses.237 
In addition to these reforms, a structural limit on news corporations’ 
ownership of media resources should be inscribed in their corporate 
charters, and required as conditions for obtaining a public broadcast license.  
Furthermore, portions of the broadcast spectrum should be declared off-
limits to for-profit private corporations. 
LOCALLY CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS 
 So far, this article has largely focused on federal control as the most 
desirable source of public authority over corporate activity.  We have 
described cases, such as defense, in which public interests would effectively 
be protected by a system of federal chartering.  In addition, we have 
explored reasons to restructure specific industry sectors, such as tobacco 
and auditing, in order to place a critical part of the industry under direct 
public control at the federal level.  We have also cited federal limits on 
media corporations as a means of curbing their ability to crowd out 
competing voices with a legitimate right to public expression.  We now turn 
to specific sectors of the economy where, in order to protect the public 
interest, it will be more effective to re-envision the corporation through a 
framework of local control. 
Municipal control is most necessary with corporations that provide 
essential services like electricity, water, and transportation to individual 
communities because of the important function of these services and the 
technologies associated with them.  The social value of these entities is 
measured by their responsiveness to the people they serve, rather than their 
ability to benefit remote shareholders.  Moreover, their inherent 
technological requirements and structural efficiencies make them “natural 
monopolies.”238  Tyson Slocum, the research director of Public Citizen’s 
Critical Mass Energy Project, describes how electricity generation and 
distribution is one such monopoly: 
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Unlike other industries in the American economy, it is very 
difficult to foster competition in the electricity industry.  
Electricity’s high overhead costs limit the number of players, since 
it requires hundreds of millions to build or buy a power plant . . . . 
Constraints on sitting power plants also inhibit competition 
because plants must be near power lines and meet minimum public 
health standards, since those using natural gas, oil or coal (as 70 
percent of U.S. plants do) produce harmful emissions.239 
In order to determine how the provision of essential services like 
electricity and water can best serve the public interest, we cannot look 
merely at what level of government should charter a corporation; we must 
also look at whether a public or private institution is best suited to providing 
such services.  Municipally incorporated utilities, restricted to a specific 
purpose and accountable to the local citizens, are arguably the best equipped 
to provide continuous services to the broader population. 
The 2000–2001 California electricity crises illustrates the difference 
between municipally accountable services and shareholder-driven utility 
companies that are free to gouge consumers in a deregulated environment.  
The manipulation of California’s electricity markets cost ratepayers tens of 
billions of dollars, but it did not affect cities such as Sacramento and Los 
Angeles, which controlled their own utilities.240  These cities were not 
subject to the predatory price-gouging and artificial shortages created by 
Enron and other companies. 
Across the country, 2,100 municipalities own their own utilities, and 
there are an additional 900 energy cooperatives.241  In 1999, the Department 
of Energy found that, on average, customers who owned their utilities paid 
18 percent less than customers of investor-owned utilities.242  The New 
Rules Project explains, “[b]ecause customer-owned utilities are democratic 
and locally controlled, and service rather than profit oriented, we should 
encourage their formation.  In today’s topsy-turvy electricity world, states 
should encourage the formation not only of customer-owned distribution 
utilities, but public transmission utilities and generation utilities as well.”243 
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Beyond the financial advantage of customer ownership, the technological 
scale and fragmentation inherent in local control provides the additional 
benefits of stability and environmental protection.  As the big northeastern 
blackout of August 2003 demonstrated, a nationally or regionally integrated 
grid system is potentially vulnerable to a failure in one location.  
Recognizing that vulnerability, beginning in the early 1980s, Pentagon 
analysts and energy efficiency experts made the case that a decentralized 
system of energy and electricity would improve our national security.244  
Smaller, locally owned utilities rarely build giant power plants that are 
costlier to the environment and prime targets for terrorist attacks.245  
Additionally, municipal control facilitates the introduction of locally 
appropriate and ecologically sustainable technologies.246 
Past examples demonstrate that municipal services performed better 
under public control than when privatized.  According to historian Clifton 
Hood, New York City’s subway system was first operated in 1904 by the 
Interborough Rapid Transit Company and then in conjunction with the 
Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company after 1913.247  Rising inflation after 
World War I caused both companies to teeter in and out of bankruptcy, so 
the city started its own subway network in 1933.  The Independent Subway 
System competed with the private lines, which delivered poor service, and 
in 1940, the city created a unified, municipally run system.248 
Firefighting is another example of a service that was once in the private 
sector but is now traditionally maintained as a public service.  Communities 
that have experimented with the privatization of firefighting services have 
reported disastrous results.  In 1985, the Salem, Arkansas Fire Corporation 
arrived at a fire and let the home burn because the owner had not paid the 
$20 annual subscription fee.249 “Once we verified that there was no life in 
danger, and no immediate danger to a [subscriber’s] property, then 
according to our rules we had no choice but to back off,” explained the fire 
corporation’s chief.250 
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The experience with essential services suggests that tightened regulation 
and federal chartering may not be the most effective means of providing 
public benefits.  Local, customer-owned services, managed either by 
municipal governments or as independent utilities, are much more 
responsive to the needs of their constituents than corporations, whose 
principle allegiance is to another constituency—their shareholders.  The 
example of essential services suggests that for some sectors of the economy, 
institutional approaches like these may be more appropriate. 
CONCLUSION: FROM PRIVATE BACK TO PUBLIC 
 As Alan Wolfe once suggested, 
If we believe that corporations are private agents, they are free to 
mind their own business outside the purview of the rest of society. 
. . . If, on the other hand, corporations are understood as public 
actors, all these conclusions are reversed.  Corporations have 
obligations not only to their shareholders, but also to others in the 
society as well; they have public duties. . . .251 
The legacy of the corporation as a private entity beginning with 
Dartmouth and continuing with the adoption of general incorporation laws 
resulted in the loss of an important means of holding corporations 
accountable to the public interest.  Although “the idea persisted that the 
state conferred the privileges of incorporation not simply for the private 
benefit of the incorporators, but also to further the general welfare,”252 easy 
access to incorporation significantly weakened the perspective that 
corporations are entities with privileged legal status created by the state.253 
The acquisition of certain constitutional rights and the dissemination of 
key judicial doctrines and legal theories provided the corporation even 
further independence from the state.  The result is an assumption that the 
state can no longer bargain on behalf of the public in exchange for the 
advantages of incorporation—a major concession.  The implications of this 
concession are rarely raised in public debates over corporate accountability. 
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In this  article, we have invoked specific examples of corporations and 
industries (e.g. media, defense, financial accounting, and community-based 
services) that are commonly considered to be more public than private.  But 
ultimately, it is important to ask how private can any corporation be if it 
exists by legal rights granted to it by a public charter? 
Corporate law and theory have long been skewed in the direction of 
treating corporations as private entities.  As a result, citizens’ ability to 
reclaim our fundamental authority to determine the role corporations should 
play in society has been thoroughly undermined.  It is as if we have been 
colonized by the very institutions we granted the privilege to exist.254  Only 
by showing how corporations are essentially public entities can we reassert 
the authority of states, laws and ultimately, the sovereign rights of the 
people to control corporations. 
Rather than attempting to force corporate law to attend to these questions 
immediately, we recognize that public opinion must change significantly 
before it will be possible to achieve corporate law reforms.  The arguments 
to be made for conceptualizing the public nature of corporations are defined 
not merely in corporate law, but are rooted in the broader culture.  Debates 
like the one here must occur in public forums before the impetus for 
developing a framework of effective law reform can occur. 
David Millon suggests that corporate law has never had an ambitious 
social agenda.255  It is hard to imagine how it would come to have a social 
orientation in the future.  In fact, corporate law may be an impediment to 
real corporate accountability.  Policy debates surrounding existing theories 
of the corporation tend to drag participants into a dynamic that 
impoverishes democratic imagination. 
Until citizens fully imagine ways to reassert our collective authority over 
corporations, we will necessarily work within corporate-dominated political 
and economic systems to raise questions about corporate power.  We want 
to know why there is no balance sheet that accounts for public subsidies to 
corporations and the estimated $2.6 trillion in both legal and illegal costs 
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that corporations cost the public each year.256  What exempts corporations 
from this kind of corporate accounting? 
From the beginning of their existence, corporations have had a public 
dimension.  Actually, the concept of corporations as private entities is more 
artificial than the idea of public corporations.  The theory of the private 
corporation is the product of decades of advocacy by corporate lawyers, 
judicial opinions and doctrines that favor corporate interests and legislation 
dominated by corporate influence.  By reclaiming a history of the 
corporation we can begin to lay the foundation for legitimizing a new public 
theory of corporations. 
In the Dartmouth College case Justice Marshall wrote, “[t]he objects for 
which a corporation is created are universally such as the government 
wishes to promote.  They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this 
benefit constitutes the consideration, and in most cases, the sole 
consideration of the grant [of corporate identity].”257 
In another famous United States Supreme Court case, Charles River 
Bridge,258 Chief Justice Taney insisted that the notion of corporate charters 
as private contracts be rejected, and that corporations must benefit the 
whole community: “[W]e must not forget, that the community also have 
rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on 
their faithful preservation.”259 
As Justices Byron White, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall 
noted in First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti: 
Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the purpose of 
furthering certain economic goals.  In order to facilitate the 
achievement of such ends, special rules relating to such matters as 
limited liability, perpetual life, and the accumulation, distribution, 
and taxation of assets are normally applied to them.  States have 
provided corporations with such attributes in order to increase their 
economic viability and thus strengthen the economy generally.  It 
has long been recognized, however, that the special status of 
corporations has placed them in a position to control vast amounts 
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of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate not only 
the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the electoral 
process. . . . The State need not permit its own creation to consume 
it.260 
These Justices are correct about the nature of corporate power and the 
threat it creates to democracy.  The state should not stand back in the face of 
pervasive corporate power and allow itself to be overpowered and 
consumed.  If we consistently remember that corporations are creatures of 
the state and its laws, and that “We The People,” acting through our 
democratic governments, have the power to control corporations, we will be 
on the path toward restoring democracy. 
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